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Privatization in the Developing World
MICHAEL BREEN & DAVID DOYLE
School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, Glasnevin, Ireland
ABSTRACTAQ1 ?????.
The last four decades have witnessed the revision of the traditional relationship
between the state and the productive sector. Triggered by the problems associated
with state-led industrialization, many developing economies, from the 1970s
onwards, began to adopt structural reforms that signiﬁcantly reduced the presence
of the state in the national economy. Privatization, the sale of state-owned assets,
was centripetal to this process, and it has repeatedly proven to be a catalyst for
fractious distributional and political battles (Przeworski 1991). The scale of state
divestiture has been notable. Between 1988 and 1999, the average revenue generated
by privatization was US$349 million per annum, per country, across 77 developing
world economies. Between the years 2000 and 2008, privatization proceeds averaged
US$399 million per annum, across 41 developing world countries. The decision of
embattled administrations to sell, or re-nationalize, state-owned assets continues to
generate heated debates. Given the political and economic importance of this issue,
particularly in light of the current global economic downturn, it is essential that we
understand what shapes the adoption and extent of privatization.
There is a large literature on privatization. In particular, the potential eﬃciency
gain from privatization has received considerable attention from economists (see for
example, Dewenter and Malatesta 2001). There are now a growing number of
empirical studies that explore the determinants of privatization across countries and
across time (see Boix 1997; Brune and Garrett 2000; Biglaiser and Danis 2002;
Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco 2003; Brune, Garrett and Kogut 2004; Meseguer
2004; Henisz, Zellner and Guille´n 2005; Schneider, Fink and Tenbu¨cken 2005;
Murillo and Martı´nez-Gallardo 2007; Zohlnho¨fer, Obinger and Wolf 2008; Doyle
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2010; Bjørnskov and Potrafke 2011). The majority of these studies, however, focus
exclusively on the advanced industrialized nations and many of them have been
hampered by methodological limitations coupled with the lack of reliable,
comparable and temporal data on privatization. Consequently, quantitative studies
have produced divergent explanations for cross-national variation in levels of state
divestiture.
We build on this empirical literature, and contend that this divergence is partly
rooted in the manner in which these studies operationalize privatization. Privatiza-
tion is generally modeled as a single homogenous transaction and in addition, the
measurement of state divestiture has tended to vary widely across this literature. In
contrast, we argue that privatization is best modeled as a two-stage process.1 There is
the ﬁrst stage, involving the initial decision to either adopt to reject privatization as a
reform measure, followed by a second stage, concerning what to sell and how much.
What is more, the incentives that shape the initial decision to privatize will not
necessarily have a similar eﬀect on the scale of state divestiture.
We utilize the comprehensive global dataset on privatization from the World Bank
as a reliable cross-national and temporal measure of state divestiture. We model
privatization as a two-stage process, involving an initial decision over whether or not
to privatize, and a subsequent decision over the size of asset sales. Utilizing a probit
model, together with a time-series cross-sectional model, we estimate the eﬀect of
endogenous and exogenous political and economic pressures on privatization across
77 developing world economies between the years 1988 and 1999, and 41 developing
economies between the years 2000 and 2008. We ﬁnd that the initial decision to
privatize is largely shaped by exogenous variables, perhaps no surprise given the
international context, while the scale of state divestiture is primarily a product of
political battles and domestic economic realities.
The paper is structured as follows. The ﬁrst section discusses trends in
privatization around the world; the second section considers the empirical work
on state divestiture, while the third section presents both the data and the method.
The fourth section discusses the results of these estimations, while the ﬁnal section
presents the conclusion and discusses the wider implications of this research.
The Revenue from Privatization
The World Bank has recorded the proceeds from individual privatization
transactions, including full and partial divestitures, concessions, management
contracts and leases since 1988.2 From these individual transactions, we have
constructed a time-series cross-sectional dataset covering 77 emerging economies
between 1988 and 1999, and 41 developing economies from 2000 to 2008, with one
observation on the proceeds of privatization, as a percentage of GDP, for each
country, for each year in question.3 It is important to note that privatization is a
multifaceted concept. In this paper, we are interested in material transactions that
generate revenue for the government from privatization, or private sector
participation in an existing state-owned asset. Privatization can also encompass
formal transactions, involving an amendment to the legal status of a company, but
not share sales, and functional transactions, involving contracts such as public–
private partnerships (see Zohlnho¨fer, Obinger and Wolf 2008: 97).4
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It was necessary to split the analysis into two periods, 1988–1999 and 2000–2008,
as the data are qualitatively diﬀerent in each period. In the earlier period, the World
Bank has included voucher transactions and smaller transactions under $1 million.
We split the sample because we were unable to identify all of the voucher
transactions. Even if it were possible to do so, excluding them would sacriﬁce
important variation in the data, as they were a central component of several waves of
privatization in the 1990s. The comprehensive coverage of this data allows us to
illustrate, in Figure 1, trends in privatization over the last two decades.
As can be seen from this graph, the revenue generated by national asset sales has
increased, with some troughs, over time. In 1988, the ﬁrst year of our sample,
revenue from privatization amounted to a little over US$1.2 billion and involved
only 14 countries, but by 1997, over 60 countries were engaged in privatization,
generating some US$33 billion in total revenue for that year. In the early years of our
second sample, while the total number of countries selling state assets fell, the
revenues from privatization remained rather large. For example, for every year bar
2002, revenues from privatization exceeded US$10 billion. In fact, the largest
single volume of revenue recorded in a given year, US$38 billion, was as recently as
2008.
There is also signiﬁcant regional variation in privatization. The ﬁrst region to
generate signiﬁcant revenue from privatization was Latin America, with a sharp
initial peak in the early 1990s, driven by the rapid and aggressive privatization
programs of Argentina and Mexico. Following a brief hiatus, revenues peaked again
in the late 1990s, this time driven by the privatization program of Brazil and to a
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Figure 1. Privatization across the globe.
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lesser extent Colombia. Interestingly, revenues fell sharply after 1999, and remained
quite low throughout our second sample period.5
In Africa, the initial adoption of privatization was far slower, and revenues far
smaller. However, with the onset of privatization programs in Nigeria, Ghana,
Egypt and Morocco from 1993, the proceeds from state divestiture across the region
increased steadily, a trend maintained through the 1990s, as these countries were
joined by South Africa, Tanzania and Senegal. From the early 2000s, we can observe
a rather rapid increase in revenues, driven by large waves of privatization in Nigeria,
the North African states of Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria, and in Ghana and Kenya to
a lesser extent.
In the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, revenue increased
until the mid-1990s, primarily driven by the small, but consistent privatization
programs of Hungary and the Czech Republic, before revenues rose sharply, as
Russia, Poland and Slovakia joined their neighbors in the sale of state assets. The
temporary hiatus of privatization in Russia in the early 2000s caused a drop in
revenue, but revenue soon climbed sharply again, as Bulgaria, Serbia and
Romania began privatizing and Russia once again raised very large sums through
asset sales.6
During the 1990s, privatization proceeds in Asia, like that of Latin America,
displayed two distinct peaks. The ﬁrst peak in the early 1990s can be explained by the
onset of privatization programs in China, Indonesia, India and Malaysia, while the
second peak, in the late 1990s, shortly after the East Asian ﬁnancial crisis, can be
partly explained by increased sales in China and Thailand. More signiﬁcantly
however, after 2000, we can observe a precipitous rise in the income raised by asset
sales. The revenue during this period accounts for nearly half of all global proceeds
from privatization. The burgeoning privatization programs of developing world
giants, such as India and Pakistan and, most notably, China, drive this trend, and
this near vertical increase in revenue across Asia shows no signs of abating.
Clearly then, privatization continues to remain an important source of revenue for
national governments, but what explains these trends?
Why do States Privatize?
There is an extensive literature on privatization, the majority of which is primarily
concerned with the economic utility of state divestiture (see Dewenter and Malatesta
2001).7 There is a small but growing body of quantitative work that focuses on the
causal factors driving privatization across countries and across time. This literature
oﬀers a number of explanations for state divestiture, the most prominent of which
include partisanship (Boix 1997; Doyle 2010), the pressures of liberalization
(Schneider, Fink and Tenbu¨cken 2005), diﬀusion (Meseguer 2004), domestic
economic conditions (Brune and Garrett 2000; Zohlnho¨fer, Obinger and Wolf
2008) and the design of legal institutions (Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco 2003).
We contribute to this empirical literature, and suggest that the diﬀerent results
produced by these quantitative studies can be partly explained by the operationa-
lization of state divestiture as a single transaction in econometric estimations,
involving a unitary decision process. We contend that privatization is best modeled
as a two-stage process, involving an initial decision over whether to adopt
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privatization or not, and if adopted as a reform measure, a subsequent decision over
the scale and extent of what to divest (see also Meseguer 2004; Doyle 2010). What is
more, at each stage of this process endogenous and exogenous variables will generate
diﬀerent incentives. Therefore, the factors that inﬂuence the initial decision to adopt
privatization may not necessarily have a similar eﬀect regarding the scale and extent
of asset sales.
Let us consider the initial decision to select privatization as a reform measure. A
national government, when contemplating such a move, will be confronted with a
combination of incentives and constraints. Firstly, trade liberalization may place
downward pressure on governments to adopt privatization. The logic is straightfor-
ward. Large state sectors cushion market mechanisms, distorting prices and wages.
To sustain state sectors, governments must raise taxes or increase borrowing, thereby
forcing interest rates to rise and depressing economic activity, deleteriously aﬀecting
output and employment (Garrett 1998: 792). Therefore, the eﬃciency concerns of
increasing trade competition generate incentives to privatize. This pressure is
exacerbated by the liberalization of capital controls. The imperative to attract mobile
capital in today’s globalized markets may convince national governments to
implement privatization as a means to woo capital with investment opportunities,
often at signiﬁcantly reduced prices and in near-monopolistic market conditions. In
fact, the empirical evidence of Schneider, Fink and Tenbu¨cken (2005: 718–719)
indicates that the main driver of infrastructure privatization in OECD states was the
liberalization of capital markets.
Secondly, the initial decision to select privatization may be shaped by processes of
international diﬀusion and emulation (Brune and Garrett 2004; Meseguer 2004).
Governments may choose privatization as a consequence of bounded learning, or
cognitive heuristics, whereby governments place exaggerated stock in a measure’s
superiority and simply adopt it wholesale, regardless of its relevance for their own
context (Weyland 2005). Emulation can also be social, whereby states herd simply on
the behavior of their peers (Meseguer 2004: 312). For developing countries, given the
international context at the beginning of the 1990s, this incentive may have been
exacerbated, due to the debt crisis in Latin America, and the process of market
liberalization in Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Emulative
processes played a large role in the initiation of privatizations across Latin America
(see Meseguer 2004; Doyle 2010), while peer dynamics had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
adoption of pension privatization across Eastern Europe and Central Asia (see
Brooks 2005).
The international ﬁnancial institutions can also directly inﬂuence a government’s
decision to adopt privatization (Henisz, Zellner and Guille´n 2005). The debt crises of
the 1980s witnessed the IMF launch the ﬁrst structural adjustment programs (SAPs),
which included measures to liberalize, privatize and deregulate economic activity in
borrowing countries (Henisz, Zellner and Guille´n 2005: 872). Structural condition-
ality, of which privatization became an important component, went on to become a
common feature of both IMF and World Bank programs. For both institutions, the
principal rationale for privatization is the assumption that the private sector will be
able to increase the eﬃciency of production (Biersteker 1990: 485). Conditionality,
then, is a tool to pressure borrowing countries to privatize ineﬃcient state enterprises
and empirical evidence has demonstrated the positive correlation between the
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likelihood of adopting majority privatization and exposure to multilateral lenders in
71 countries between 1977 and 1999 (Henisz, Zellner and Guille´n 2005).
The initial decision to privatize will also be shaped by domestic politics. As
privatization is often associated with fractious political processes, the potential
political leverage privatization may aﬀord, will aﬀect the strategic behavior of
governments and, consequently, the adoption of reform (Murillo and Martı´nez-
Gallardo 2007). Domestic opposition, in the form of public sector unions and
domestic export industries, will have to be overcome. For example, in India the
militancy of public sector unions undermined repeated attempts to initiate
privatization (Gupta 2008). In Argentina, during the administration of Rau´l
Alfonsı´n, some of the ﬁercest opposition to privatization came from the rent-seeking
patria contratistas or capitanes de la industria (Captains of Industry) who beneﬁted
enormously from lucrative contracts with the public sector (Corrales 1998).AQ2 In
Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, domestic industry was initially very hesitant to
support privatization for fear their businesses would be unable to compete with
privatized ﬁrms (Bennell 1997: 1797).
Initiating an unpopular measure such as privatization will also be partly a product
of the institutional limitations that national governments face. For example, in
Uruguay in 1992, the attempted privatization of the state telecom company,
ANTEL, was prevented by public plebiscite, while in 2003, legislation to end the
monopoly of the state oil company, ANCAP, was again overturned by referendum
(see Bensio´n 2006). The probability of policy adoption is dependent upon the
number of veto players in a political system, and the similarity of their preferences
(Tsebelis 2002).
Finally, ﬁscal distress may prompt a government to adopt privatization. When
heavily indebted, privatization can provide states with the means to pay creditors,
to ﬁnance current expenditure and to reduce deﬁcits (Bortolotti, Fantini and
Siniscalco 2003: 309). The resultant reduced levels of external debt will send signals
of credibility to the market, improving a country’s credit rating and generating
lower interest payments (Biglaiser and Brown 2003: 80). Likewise, stagnant or
negative growth rates, or repeated bouts of price instability may induce states to
consider divestiture (Biglaiser and Danis 2002: 91), as not only will such
transactions generate much-needed revenue for the state, but also because
privatization is often seen as a growth-stimulating measure (Zohlnho¨fer, Obinger
and Wolf 2008: 103).
Once the decision has been made to begin privatizing, governments are then faced
with a second decision regarding how much to actually divest. What is more, what
drives the initial decision to adopt privatization may not necessarily drive the scale of
privatization revenue in a similar manner. Let us begin with the perspective of the
seller. Once a national government has decided to privatize, electoral incentives will
prompt governments to act strategically, and therefore the core clientele of the
governing party will shape the decision of how much to sell. Left-leaning
governments will be associated with lower volumes of privatization, given the
negative dislocating eﬀect that privatization will have on their core support (Boix
1997; Zohlnho¨fer, Obinger and Wolf 2008; Doyle 2010, 2012; Bjørnskov and
Potrafke 2011), while right-leaning parties will be associated with higher volumes of
privatization (Boix 1997; Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco 2003).
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Secondly, the international ﬁnancial institutions may also serve the very useful
role of political alibi for much-needed reform (Vreeland 2003). In this scenario,
governments, irrespective of their partisan hue, will attempt to ameliorate domestic
political tensions by scapegoating the IMF for privatization. Governments enter into
IMF agreements even when they do not need foreign exchange, in order to utilize
IMF conditions to push through large privatizations (Vreeland 2003; Doyle 2012).
Therefore, privatization revenues may prove to be larger when a government is part
of an IMF agreement or indebted to a multilateral institution.
Thirdly, once the decision to privatize has been made, and privatizations have
begun, the attitude of domestic interest groups may change considerably. For
example, in Argentina, Menem, in order to overcome the opposition of rent-seeking
indigenous industry, began to involve them in privatizations on highly preferential
terms, and within a short time period domestic industry became vocal advocates of
privatization (Treisman 2003: 97). In Mexico in the early 1990s, to pave the way for
the sale of the state telecom company, TELMEX, the Carlos Salinas administration
co-opted the union leaders with resources generated by this privatization (see Clifton
2000). In Ghana, the acquiescence of workers in state-owned ﬁrms was secured with
guarantees of very large beneﬁts (Bennell 1997: 1797), while in India, the ability to
purchase shares in newly privatized ﬁrms increased support amongst the middle
classes for the sale of state assets (Gupta 2008: 185–186).8
Finally, just as institutional limitations can hamper attempts to introduce
privatization, the interests of veto players may impede the size and extent of
national governments’ privatization plans. Take the government of Victor Ciorbea
in Romania in 1996 as an example. A range of veto players hostile to state
divestiture, combined with weak institutional and bureaucratic structures, repeatedly
hampered his administration’s attempts to expand the scale of privatization (Pop-
Eleches 2009: 230–233).
The revenue generated by privatization will also be shaped by the incentives that
potential investors face. The scale of revenue may not just be driven by the coercive
eﬀects of conditionality per se, but also by the important signaling and credibility
eﬀects of conditionality. Participation in an IFI-sponsored program should send a
positive signal to market actors who may be interested in undertaking the sort of
long-term investment that privatization implies (Brune, Garrett and Kogut 2004).
Evidence indicates that investors are willing to pay a premium for divested assets in
countries that are subject to IMF conditionality, as they view conditionality as a
signal of credible policy reform (Brune, Garrett and Kogut 2004).
The scale of privatization also rests on the ability of national governments to
demonstrate a credible commitment to reform, thus ameliorating the fear of
expropriation for potential investors. Without suﬃcient credibility, a government
will simply ﬁnd it too diﬃcult to attract interest from buyers. Biglaiser and Danis
(2002) for example, demonstrate that democratic regimes, due to the transparency of
their legal institutions, durable constraints on political actors and respect for
property rights, are associated with a greater propensity to privatize than their
authoritarian counterparts. A well-functioning stock market, and a legal system that
facilitates privatization transactions and protects the purchasers of divested state
assets from future opportunistic behavior, are also necessary for the success of any
privatization program (Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco 2003). In addition, healthy
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economic fundamentals can signal stability and sound economic governance,
creating a far more hospitable investment climate (Brune and Garrett 2000; Biglaiser
and Danis 2002).
The next section will discuss our empirical strategy for modeling privatization as
the two-stage process described above.
Data and Method
We utilize the World Bank (2011) database on privatization as a cross-national
measure of state divestiture. From this we have generated two unbalanced panel
datasets, covering 77 developing economies during the period 1988–1999, and 41
developing economies during 2000–2008. In all of our statistical tests, the number of
countries and observations is based on data availability. We model privatization as a
two-stage process, and estimate a probit model together with a time-series, cross-
sectional model, on both the decision to implement privatization, and the subsequent
extent of asset sales.
The Variables
Our dependent variable, privatization revenue as a percentage of GDP, is taken from
the World Bank’s Privatization Database (World Bank 2011).9 It has been used in
previous studies (see Brune, Garrett and Kogut 2004) and allows us to diﬀerentiate
among countries that have privatized in small quantities versus those that have
undertaken large-scale privatization programs. As this variable is highly dispersed,
we use its natural log transformation.
We build upon previous studies by considering two further measures:
privatization revenue as a percentage of employment and privatization as a
percentage of value added. This is to ensure that our analysis is sensitive to the
diﬀerent ways in which the implementation of privatization can aﬀect the amount
of revenue generated. Governments must select from a range of options including:
initial public oﬀerings on stock exchanges, cash auctions, auctions where the
winner extends a loan to the government, investment tenders, the distribution of
vouchers to the population, or the retention of ‘golden shares’. Given this range of
options, it is very likely that politics is decisive. For example, a left-leaning
government might select a method of privatizing that protects workers but
generates less revenue for the same asset as a right-leaning government that
selected a strategy that generated more revenue at the expense of labor. It makes
sense, therefore, to also examine privatization as a percentage of employment, and
as a percentage of value added to account for variations in the way revenue is
generated by the state.10
Although our dependent variable is a useful proxy for the scope of privatization,
we argue privatization is best modeled as a two-stage process, whereby a government
must ﬁrst decide on whether or not to privatize in a given year, before deciding on
the scope of asset sales. Therefore, to capture the ﬁrst stage of the privatization
process – that is, whether or not to select privatization as a reform measure – we
utilize a simple binary variable, where a year in which a privatization transaction
occurred is coded as ‘1’ and all other years are coded as ‘0’.
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In order to explain the cross-national variation in both the adoption and extent of
state divestiture, we include a range of explanatory variables. Firstly, we consider
one of the main challenges for quantitative studies on privatization: the initial size of
the state-owned sector. Both the decision to privatize and the extent of any
subsequent privatization should be inﬂuenced by the existing stock of state-owned
enterprises. However, little cross-national data exists on this issue and previous
studies have employed indices of economic freedom as proxies for the size of the
state sector. One problem with such indices, however, is that countries with large
state-owned sectors may score highly, as the indices also capture the quality of
regulation and the business environment. We use domestic credit to the private sector
as a percentage of GDP, from the World Bank’s Development Indicators (2011).
Although by no means a perfect proxy, it does allow us to control for the importance
of the domestic private sector in an economy. However, this variable also has its
issues. It may reﬂect the health of the banking system, rather than the size of the
public sector.
Secondly, we capture exogenous pressures by controlling for trade and the level of
capital mobility. Taken together, these variables capture the extent of a country’s
economic interdependence with the rest of the world. Trade is simply imports plus
exports as a percentage of GDP, and is taken from the World Bank’s Development
Indicators (2011), while we use the Chinn and Ito (2008) index of capital account
openness, based on information from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, in order to capture the degree of capital
mobility.
Previous empirical studies have suggested that a relationship exists between the
IMF and increased levels of privatization (Brune, Garrett and Kogut 2004).
Therefore, we include IMF credit as a percentage of GDP in our speciﬁcations
(World Bank 2011). This variable represents the reliance of some developing markets
on IMF support. In line with previous research, we expect to ﬁnd a positive and
signiﬁcant association between IMF lending and privatization revenue.
Thirdly, we consider the preferences of political actors, the structural
characteristics of political systems, and the institutional make-up of the state.
The decision to privatize has long been associated with political parties on the
right. As a consequence, although this is a crude proxy, we control for the
ideological orientation of the executive (right, center, left) (see Marshall and
Jaggers 2002).11 Second, we include a variable that accounts for the number of
veto players that can potentially hamper government action on privatization. This
is the checks variable from the database of political institutions (Beck et al. 2001).
Third, we control for the eﬀect of an election to the legislative or executive branch.
Governments should wait until after an election to push through privatization
measures in order to reduce the political backlash that might ensue. This is a
dummy variable, coded as 1 for any year in which a presidential or legislative
election was held (Beck et al. 2001).
We also consider the origin of a country’s legal system and employ a dummy
variable to control for British legal heritage. La Porta, Lo´pez-de-Silanes and Shleifer
(2008) ﬁnd that legal heritage is correlated with a broad range of economic
outcomes, including the protection of investors, shareholders and creditors from
expropriation. For the most part, common law systems tend to provide greater
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protection for investors, so we expect that countries with a British legal heritage will
generate larger volumes of revenue from national asset sales.
Finally, we include several economic variables that capture long- and short-term
domestic economic conditions, including CPI inﬂation (logged), GDP growth (per
cent), GDP per capita (constant USD, 2000, logged) and external debt as a
percentage of GDP. We expect for example, that a high level of inﬂation will prompt
the state to divest public assets to combat economic malaise. By contrast, a high level
of external debt might result in privatization in order to raise revenue for debt service
and reduce the primary deﬁcit. All of these variables are taken from the World
Bank’s Development Indicators (2011).
The Model
We model privatization in two stages: an initial stage involving decisions over
whether or not to adopt privatization, followed by a second stage, involving
decisions over how much to sell. One advantage of this approach is that many
developing world states have never bothered with privatization. Without taking into
consideration the proﬁle of countries that never privatized, a statistical analysis
would only capture some of the substantial variation in this outcome. It might even
add bias, inﬂating the importance of the attributes of countries that privatized while
ignoring speciﬁc attributes of those that did not. In other words, the decision to
undertake privatization and the decision over the subsequent scope of privatization
are not independent. In order to correctly analyze both decisions and the systematic
relationship between each decision, we begin by estimating a probit model on the
decision to privatize. We follow Carter and Signorino’s advice (2010: 1559) and use
cubic polynomial approximation to address the problem of time dependence in the
binary data. From the probit model, we generate the inverse mills ratio – Heckman’s
(1979) correction. We include this as a control variable in the second stage of the
statistical analysis, where our dependent variable is privatization revenue (as a
percentage of GDP, employment and value-added). Doing this allows us to examine
systematic diﬀerences between the countries that received something from
privatization, and those that received nothing at all.
Although the Heckman selection model is appropriate for this task, it performs
poorly without an exclusion restriction – a variable that enters the selection equation
but does not enter the outcome equation (Sartori 2003: 112). We use regional
emulation as our exclusion restriction. This variable measures the number of
countries in the region that privatized in the previous year. It is a good exclusion
restriction because it is unlikely to aﬀect the actual scale of privatization. It would
make little sense for a state to emulate the precise scale of its neighbors’ eﬀorts, when
each faces a very diﬀerent set of political, economic and social obstacles. Rather, it is
more likely that diﬀusion operates at a more general level, pushing neighboring
countries to adopt broadly similar strategies but adapt these strategies to their own
unique circumstances. Therefore, the inclusion of this variable in the selection
equation is justiﬁed on theoretical grounds and is not merely a practical measure to
improve model ﬁt.
In the second stage of our analysis, we utilize ordinary least squares (OLS) with
panel-corrected standard errors to correct for panel heteroscedasticity and spatial
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correlation (see Beck and Katz 1995). We do not include a lagged dependent variable
in our models, as to do so would bias our estimator. Rather, we follow Achen (2000),
who recommends leaving out the lagged dependent variable and correcting for ﬁrst-
order autocorrelation. We also repeat our speciﬁcations with ﬁxed eﬀects to account
for possible time-invariant, country-speciﬁc unobserved factors that aﬀect privatiza-
tion. Finally, we lag all independent variables by one year to avoid simultaneity. The
basic form of this equation is as follows:
Revenueit ¼ ai þ b1it1 þ b2it1 þ . . .þ bnit1 þ m1it
In the equation above, a represents country dummies, b is the parameter estimate for
the independent variables, while m represents the error term. The dependent variable
will be observed if the g of PRIVit, that is the decision to privatize or not in a given
year, plus the second error term, u2it4 0, where:
u1  Nð0; sÞ
u2  Nð0;1Þ
corrðu1;u2Þ ¼ p
Results
Tables 1 and 2 present our ﬁndings for 1988–1999 and 2000–2008, respectively. The
ﬁrst column of each table presents estimates from the probit model on the initial
decision to privatize. The other columns present estimates using our three dependent
variables. For each dependent variable, we specify three models: one with country-
speciﬁc ﬁxed-eﬀects, another with the AR1AQ3 correction and another with both. The
results are remarkably consistent across our three measures of privatization. For the
most part, the coeﬃcients maintain the same direction, level of statistical
signiﬁcance, and magnitude. One minor diﬀerence is that an increase in GDP per
capita is associated with a slightly higher increase in revenue from privatization as a
percentage of employment. This suggests that richer states might place fewer
restrictions on sales in order to increase asset values because they are less interested
in protecting workers.
Firstly, let us consider the relationship between the ﬁrst stage, the initial decision
to privatize, and the second stage, concerning the scope of state divestiture. Across
every single speciﬁcation of the TSCSAQ4 models for the 1988–1999 sample, the selection
eﬀect from the probit model is statistically signiﬁcant. Clearly, the decision to select
privatization as a reform measure is related to the subsequent scale of asset sales,
justifying our contention to model privatization as a two-stage process. However, in
the second sample, 2000–2008, the selection eﬀect does not reach levels of statistical
signiﬁcance, suggesting that the importance of deciding whether to adopt
privatization or not has waned as this structural reform has become more
widespread.
What is more, there are clearly diﬀerent mechanics at play during the initial
decision to adopt privatization, and the subsequent scale of state divestiture. The
initial decision to choose privatization as a reform measure is largely a product of
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exogenous variables, while the scale of subsequent privatizations is primarily driven
by economic conditions and domestic political interaction.
As we can see from column one in both tables, IMF is positively signed and
statistically signiﬁcant. The larger the volume of IMF loans to country i, the greater
the likelihood of country i adopting privatization at time tþ1. However, we ﬁnd little
evidence that IMF support is associated with the scale of privatization. There are
several potential explanations for this. The IMFmight successfully push governments
to adopt a privatization strategy, but governments may not properly implement this
strategy. Alternatively, IMF programs are possibly failing borrowing countries by
not catalyzing the investment necessary for governments to sell state assets.
Several further exogenous factors are also signiﬁcant determinants of the
likelihood of privatization. The exclusion restriction – that is, emulative diﬀusion –
is positively signed and statistically signiﬁcant in the probit model across both
samples. States herd on the behavior of their peers, and choose to adopt
privatization because their neighbors have done so.12 In the ﬁrst sample, capital
mobility is positively signed and statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that during this
period privatization was a means for developing economies to attract investors. The
level of trade competition is also statistically signiﬁcant, but it is negatively signed in
both probit models.13 States that are more integrated in global trade are less likely to
embark on privatization, as they must ﬁrst overcome domestic opposition from
those who beneﬁt from a large state presence in the economy.
In contrast, variation in the scale of asset sales, across both samples, is primarily
shaped by domestic political and economic concerns. Firstly, trade is statistically
signiﬁcant across both samples, although it is not robust to ﬁxed eﬀects. However,
the direction of this eﬀect diﬀers from the probit models. After overcoming the initial
hurdle, states that are more integrated with global trade derive more revenue than
others in similar circumstances. States that are more integrated with global trade
may ﬁrstly have to confront powerful sectional interests that favor a greater role for
the state in the economy. Once this hurdle has been cleared, however, export-
oriented interests have probably tipped the domestic political balance away from
policy that favors a large role for the state in the economy. This ﬁnding conﬁrms the
importance of employing a two-stage process to model privatization. Clearly, there
are systematic diﬀerences among states that privatize public enterprises and those
that do not. The substantive eﬀect of trade competition on privatization revenue is
notable. A shift from the 10th to the 90th percentile in levels of trade leads to a one
standard deviation increase in the logged value of privatization revenue as a
percentage of GDP.
The importance of domestic politics can also be observed in the results for election,
which are negatively signed and statistically signiﬁcant in every single TSCS model,
across both samples. Governments are evidently cognizant of the damaging political
after-eﬀects of state divestiture and so, in an election year, will reduce the scale of
asset sales. An election year will result in a decrease in privatization revenue of half a
standard deviation.
The ideology of the government in power also aﬀects the volume of revenue from
privatization. Government ideology is negatively signed in every TSCS model across
the ﬁrst sample, and reaches levels of statistical signiﬁcance in six of the nine
speciﬁcations. During this period, left-leaning governments are associated with lower
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levels of state divestiture. The diﬀerence between a government of the left in power
and a government of the right in power is over half a standard deviation in the
logged value of revenue as a percentage of GDP. In the second sample, although
government ideology is negatively signed and statistically signiﬁcant in three models,
it also changes signs across the remaining speciﬁcations. These results echo those of
Schneider, Fink and Tenbu¨cken (2005), who found that partisan eﬀects on
infrastructure privatization disappeared, as privatization became a widely accepted
phenomenon.
The inability of the executive to negate potential veto players also has a
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on privatization. Checks is negatively signed and
statistically signiﬁcant in all nine of the panel estimations across the second sample.
When the level of checks on the executive moves from the 10th to the 90th percentile,
the volume of revenue generated by privatization will fall by over half a standard
deviation. Politics is often a struggle over how to divide the spoils or manage the
distributional consequences of government policy. The evidence on privatization
clearly points towards domestic distributional conﬂict over the scale of economic
reform, rather than the existence of reform measures per se, although the importance
of veto players is only statistically signiﬁcant from 2000 to 2008. When taken
together, however, domestic political variables are key drivers of the scale of
privatization across both time periods.
Domestic economic conditions also clearly shape the extent of state divestiture. In
the ﬁrst sample period, debt is positively signed in all estimations, and statistically
signiﬁcant in seven of the nine models. When levels of external debt shift from the
10th to the 90th percentile, then the proceeds from privatization will increase by
nearly two standard deviations.
In contrast, in the second period GDP per capita is positively signed and achieves
levels of statistical signiﬁcance in seven of the nine speciﬁcations, while inﬂation is
negatively signed and statistically signiﬁcant across all nine speciﬁcations. The
diﬀerence between levels of inﬂation at the 10th and 90th percentile equates to a
reduction in privatization revenue of nearly one standard deviation. Much of the
privatization literature argues that poor states privatize to address an ailing
economy, but our results suggest that, initially, states employed privatization as a
means to raise revenue to service the external debt and reduce the primary deﬁcit, but
over time, once pressing economic demands have been met, privatization revenues
were greater in wealthier, more macro-economically stable states.
Finally, our proxy for the initial size of the state sector, domestic credit to the
private sector, is negatively signed in every speciﬁcation for the earlier sample, and
statistically signiﬁcant in six of them. In the later sample, this variable changes signs
across the models, and only achieves a level of statistical signiﬁcance in three of
them. Clearly, the initial size of the state sector was an important determining factor
in the early phase of state divestiture, but this waned in importance, as privatization
became a standard policy instrument.14
Robustness
For the sake of robustness, we also estimated a number of alternative speciﬁcations.
Firstly, we repeated the PCSEAQ4 models with the alternative GLS estimator.15 The
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results remained very similar. We also ran collinearity diagnostics, which indicated
that this was not an issue in any of the models. Secondly, we added a number of
additional control variables to the base speciﬁcation, including: a dummy variable to
capture the presence of an autonomous region and a dummy variable to capture the
presence of multiple levels of subnational government. Our rationale was to account
for the eﬀect of federalism on the level of privatization. We also included the
XCONST variable from Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2008); a dummy variable to
capture the presence of a functioning stock market; and the Rule of Law index from
the Worldwide Governance Indicators, for the later sample (2000–2008) (Kaufman,
Kraay and Mastruzzi 2009). We also substituted UK legal origin with a dummy
variable that records French legal origin. Even with these additional controls, the
core results remained unchanged.16
Thirdly, we controlled for the eﬀect of regime type. According to Biglaiser and
Danis (2002), regime type is an important determinant of privatization. We added
the level of democracy (POLITY) to the base speciﬁcation (Marshall and Jaggers
2008). POLITY was positively signed but statistically insigniﬁcant. Otherwise, the
results remained the same.
We also included an alternative measure for the initial size of the state-owned
sector, taken from the index of economic freedom (Gwartney, Lawson and Norton
2008). In addition, we substituted the variables that measure IMF lending with
World Bank lending and grants as a percentage of GDP, and multilateral lending as a
percentage of GDP; replaced capital mobility with FDI as a percentage of GDP; and
included regional dummies to capture any regional eﬀects. Finally, we repeated our
main speciﬁcations with publicly guaranteed debt as a percentage of exports and
public and publicly guaranteed debt service as a percentage of GNI. Once again, the
results remained unchanged.
Discussion/Conclusion
Few other reform measures have altered the relationship between the state and the
productive economy as successive waves of privatization have, and continue to do,
across the developing world. State divestiture is now a deﬁning tenet of the modern
liberal economy. However, quantitative studies on the determinants of privatization
have been limited by data and methodological restrictions. We built on this literature
and utilized the comprehensive dataset on privatization from the World Bank as a
reliable, cross-national measure of state divestiture over time. We modeled the
decision to privatize as a two-stage process, involving an initial decision over
whether or not to privatize, and a subsequent decision over how much to sell, and
estimated the main determinants of privatization across 77 developing world
economies between the years 1988 to 1999, and 41 countries between 2000 to 2008.
Our results generate a number of important insights. Firstly, exogenous and
endogenous pressures have diﬀerent roles to play at diﬀerent stages of the decision-
making process. The initial decision to privatize in developing countries is largely
shaped by exogenous incentives. The degree of capital mobility, the desire to emulate
privatizing neighbors, and the inﬂuence of the IMF, all induced developing
economies to adopt privatization as a reform measure. The extent of privatization,
however, or what to sell and how much, was shaped by diﬀerent incentives again.
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The politics of trade remain important for the volume of revenue generated by state
divestiture, but our results also indicate that this stage of the decision-making
process is conditioned by domestic variables. It is no surprise that the impetus to
adopt a fractious structural reform such as privatization would emanate from
outside the political system, while the factors determining the scale of privatization,
once the decision to adopt such a reform has been made, would primarily be a
function of domestic political and economic concerns.
This has important implications for the existing empirical literature on
privatization. If we return to the explanations for privatization, it is clear that
they all have some relevance for the story we present here. This suggests that there is
no single uniform explanation for privatization, but rather that diﬀerent incentives
for state divestiture exist at diﬀerent stages of the decision-making process and
across diﬀerent time periods (see also Meseguer 2004; Doyle 2010). Therefore, in
order to adequately understand privatization, we must disaggregate this process into
its component parts, rather than treating it as a single transaction. This also has
potential implications for other reform measures, such as labor and tax reform.
So what does this mean for a broader understanding regarding the determinants of
privatization? Our results for trade competition are interesting. States that are more
integrated in global trade are less likely to embark on privatization, but when they
commit to privatization their eﬀorts are more extensive. After overcoming the initial
hurdle, states that are more integrated with global trade derive more revenue than
others in similar circumstances. Clearly, states seek to reap the beneﬁts from
international economic integration, but this is also conditional.
The IMF has a role in encouraging states to adopt privatization, but there is little
evidence that it takes an active part in overruling government decisions regarding
what to divest and on what scale. Rather, this is primarily a product of domestic
politics: electoral concerns, the strategic interest of political parties and the ability of
the governing administration to negate potential veto players. What is more, during
the ﬁrst phase of privatization, these political battles occurred against a backdrop of
pressing external debt obligations, whereby developing world economies divested
state enterprises in order to raise revenue to pay creditors and reduce their primary
deﬁcit. However, during the second phase of privatization, although the political
struggles remained prevalent, the economic realities underpinning privatization
altered. During this period, increased revenue from state divesture was associated
with wealthier, more macro-economically stable states. When pressing macroeco-
nomic concerns have been addressed, and privatization is more widespread, the
purchasers of divested state assets began to seek stable political environments and
the protection of property rights (see Jensen 2008; Biglaiser and Staats 2009).
Notes
1. Scholars have long analyzed policy as a multi-stage process. In this paper, by a two-stage process, we
are explicitly referring to the manner in which privatization is modeled in quantitative analyses.
2. Many previous empirical studies on privatization have been limited by a lack of reliable and
comparable data. The new World Bank Privatization Database has taken existing data on
privatization between 1988 and 1999, from the old World Bank Privatization Transactions Database,
and combined it with newly released data on privatization in the developing world between 2000 and
2008.
755
760
765
770
775
780
785
790
795
Privatization in the Developing World 17
3. A full list of all countries included in this analysis can be found in the online appendix at the author’s
website.AQ5
4. The vast majority of the data represents proceeds raised by central governments only, bar a handful of
exceptions for state level utilities in a small number of major countries.
5. In this section, we discuss those countries with the largest share of revenue from privatization by region.
6. See Clifton, Comı´n and Dı´az Fuentes (2006) who note that EU liberalization directives largely
determined the timing and scale of privatization in the EU states.
7. The World Bank alone accounts for a vast amount of research on this topic.
8. Graduate economic training of civil servants in the US and Europe may also have contributed to the
re-evaluation of privatization.
9. Descriptive statistics, plus full descriptions for all variables, can be found in the appendix.
10. Every so often, states have nationalized, expropriated, or conﬁscated private property. Unfortunately,
no adequate data exists on the extent to which states have nationalized or rolled back on privatization
so it is not possible to calculate net privatization.
11. Taken from the Polity IV dataset; right was coded as 1, center as 2 and left as 3.
12. Although we cannot identify the exact causal mechanism underlying this process.
13. GDP per capita is also positively signed and statistically signiﬁcant across both probit models.
14. Capital mobility changed signs across the speciﬁcations and only reached levels of statistical
signiﬁcance in a handful of them. Likewise GDP growth and the UK legal system.
15. The results of these robustness tests can be found in the appendix.
16. The presence of a functioning stock market had a strong and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the decision to
privatize but not on the scale of privatization.
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